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Summary
In this paper, we decompose banks' systemic risk into two dimensions: the risk
of a bank (“bank tail risk”) and the link of the bank to the system in financial dis-
tress (“systemic linkage”). Based on extreme value theory,we estimate a systemic
risk measure that can be decomposed into two subcomponents reflecting these
dimensions. Empirically, we assess the relationships of bank business models to
the two dimensions of systemic risk. The observed differences in these relation-
ships partly explain why micro- and macroprudential perspectives sometimes
have different implications for banking regulation.
1 INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the emphasis of banking regulation has shifted from a microprudential approach towards a more
macroprudential approach. Before the 2007–09 financial crisis, regulation focused predominantly on the soundness of
financial institutions taken in isolation. Prudential regulation aimed at curbing excessive risk taking as a consequence
of, for example, deposit insurance. In the crisis, a substantial fraction of the global financial system became severely
distressed, which led to a sharp decline in real economic activity. This made it painfully clear that, besides the stability of
individual banks, it is also important for financial stability whether bank failures tend to occur in clusters.
With the concern of system-wide distress in mind, the macroprudential objective of prudential regulation—that is,
limiting systemic risk—gained traction on the regulatory agenda. The scope of interest for banking regulators has
widened, since aspects such as “common exposures and interlinkages across institutions,” which may be irrelevant from
a microprudential perspectives, are important from a macroprudential point of view (see Borio, 2003, 2014). Such differ-
ences between the micro- and macroprudential perspective may lead to different priorities in, or even opposing policy
implications for, banking regulation.
The origin of potentially conflicting views stemming fromdifferences between themicro- andmacroprudential perspec-
tives can be clarified by a conceptual decomposition into two subcomponents of banks' systemic risk on the cross-sectional
dimension.1 The first component is the overall risk of a bank (“bank tail risk”). The higher the level of a bank's tail risk,
the larger is the bank's unconditional probability of failure. The second component is the connection between an institu-
tion's extreme losses and systemic events (“systemic linkage”). It indicates whether the tail risk of a bank is more likely
to materialize during a financial crisis. The stronger the systemic linkage, the larger is the proportion of a bank's overall
tail risk associated with severely adverse shocks in the financial system. While the first component is relevant from both
perspectives, it is only the macroprudential perspective that is concerned with the second component.
1Throughout the paper we focus on the cross-sectional dimension of systemic risk. See Galati and Moessner (2013, section 3.1) for an overview of the
rich literature on systemic risk in the time dimension, or see, for example, De Bandt et al. (2010) for a general survey on systemic risk.
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FIGURE 1 Systemic risk and bank size. The figure shows the relationship between different dimensions of systemic risk (vertical axes)
and bank size (on the horizontal axis) in 2007:Q4. Bank size is measured by total assets (USD billions). The dashed lines show fitted linear
trends. The measures are defined in Equations 1 and 5 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
The main contribution of this paper is the empirical decomposition of banks' systemic risk into these two components
using extreme value theory (EVT). We apply the EVT approach of Van Oordt and Zhou (2017) to estimate the systemic
risk of a bank as the sensitivity of a bank's stock returns to extremely adverse shocks in the financial system based on a few
tail observations. The subcomponents of this estimator have a natural economic interpretation as the level of a bank's tail
risk (based on the bank's value-at-risk) and its systemic linkage (based on the bank's tail dependence with the system).
To demonstrate this empirically, we decompose the systemic risk of US bank holding companies (BHCs). We use this
decomposition to estimate how banks' business models affect systemic risk through each of the two subcomponents.
An example of how the decomposition can provide deeper insight into the interrelationships of bank characteristics
to systemic risk is provided in Figure 1. The figure plots banks' size against estimates of the systemic risk measure and
the two subcomponents measuring bank tail risk and systemic linkage, respectively.2 We observe downward and upward
sloping trends in the size-tail risk and size-systemic linkage interrelationships, respectively. Since the latter dominates
the former, larger banks exhibit higher levels of systemic risk. From this decomposition, we may conclude not only that
size relates positively to systemic risk, but also that this is a result of larger banks exhibiting a stronger link to the system
in financial distress.
Research on systemic risk has intensified over the past decade. Benoit et al. (2017) provided a careful review of the
recent systemic risk literature in a broader context. They distinguished two approaches to measuring systemic risk in the
literature: a “source-specific approach” and a “global approach.” Papers that follow the source-specific approach to sys-
temic risk consider specific sources of systemic risk, such as contagion risk, liquidity crises or correlated risk taking. These
sources of systemic risk are often identified in the context of a theoretical model. Regulators have introduced several tools
to monitor these different channels of systemic risk. Papers that follow the global approach aim to derive global measures
of systemic risk, potentially encompassing all the mechanisms studied in the first group of papers. Benoit et al. (2017)
categorize commonly applied measures such as marginal expected shortfall (MES) (Acharya et al., 2009, 2017), SRISK
(Acharya et al., 2017), and CoVaR (Adrian & Brunnermeier, 2016) into this second group. The systemic riskmeasure used
in the present paper best fits within this second category.3 Theoretically, it is closely related to MES, and we will also
discuss its theoretical relationship to several other measures that follow a global approach to systemic risk.
Our study contributes to three strands of literature. First, our systemic risk measure and its decomposition help to a
establish a connection between studies applying tail dependence as a proxy of systemic risk (De Jonghe, 2010, Hartmann
et al., 2007) and those applying other measures such as MES, SRISK and Exposure CoVaR. The systemic linkage compo-
nent quantifies all cross-sectional variation in the tail dependence, as tail dependence abstracts from a bank's marginal
risk. The sensitivity of banks to large shocks in the financial system depends both on the tail dependence and the lev-
els of banks' marginal risk. It is straightforward to derive that this measure quantifies all cross-sectional variation in the
MES, which is defined as the expected loss of a bank conditional upon an extremely adverse shock. In other words, the
2The log of the systemic risk measure equals the sum of the log of its two subcomponents.
3Themeasures of systemic risk and systemic linkage do not have a directional flavor: Theymeasure the comovement, regardless of the underlying cause
of shock propagation. Statistically, one could measure the sensitivity of the system to extreme shocks of an institution instead. Although this would
change the statistical direction of the conditioning event, it does not change the direction of the underlying cause of the comovement; for an excellent
discussion see, for example, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016, subsections II.C and II.D).
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two result in equivalent rankings of systemic risk across financial institutions. Moreover, we show how the Exposure
CoVaR relates to our systemic risk measure and the tail dependence. In other words, it can be regarded as an alternative
way to aggregate the systemic linkage and individual risk components into a systemic risk measure. To summarize, the
present study demonstrates the theoretical connection across the existing systemic risk measures by demonstrating how
they aggregate information differently regarding tail dependence and banks' marginal risk.
Second, we contribute to the extant literature introducing measures to rank financial institutions in terms of systemic
risk in the cross-section. To name a few examples besides the aforementioned measures, see the volatility contribution
of Lehar (2005), the distress insurance premium of Huang et al. (2009, 2012), the CoRisk measure of Chan-Lau (2010),
the measure based on principal component analysis of Billio et al. (2012) and the Shapley value developed by Drehmann
and Tarashev (2013). It is not the purpose of the present paper to improve rankings of financial institutions in terms of
systemic risk. Instead, we provide more insight into systemic risk by the aforementioned decomposition into bank tail
risk and systemic linkage.
Third, we contribute to the literature on identifying which bank characteristics are related to systemic risk. For macro-
prudential policy purposes, it is useful to measure systemic risk and identify its indicators at the bank level. Academic
literature has provided several measures of systemic risk and there is a growing literature on identifying bank character-
istics that are related to systemic risk (see, e.g., Anginer et al., 2014; Brunnermeier et al., 2012; Girardi & Ergün, 2013;
López-Espinosa et al., 2012; López-Espinosa et al., 2013; Vallascas and Keasey, 2012). On the systemic risk level, most
of our results are not novel in the sense that they confirm empirical relationships to systemic risk established in earlier
studies. However, what is new is that we also identify whether these relationships are through the bank's tail risk or the
systemic linkage dimension. This distinction is important in the regulatory arena. While the level of bank tail risk is rele-
vant for both themicro- andmacroprudential objectives of regulation, systemic linkage is relevant for themacroprudential
objective only. The distinction therefore helps to identify areas in which micro- and macroprudential objectives may lead
to differences in the scope or direction of regulation. Moreover, depending on the weights given to both objectives, the
two components should receive different weights in the regulatory debate.
From our empirical exercise we document the following observations. First, evaluating systemic risk based on conven-
tional measures, such as correlations and standard deviations, does not provide a full picture of how bank characteristics
are related to systemic risk. This ismainly because correlations do not capturewell the dependence structure for extremely
adverse shocks in the financial system. By contrast, standard deviations seem to provide a reasonably good descrip-
tion of relative differences in bank tail risk. This stresses the importance of exploring new approaches to modeling the
dependence structure among financial institutions in extreme events.
Second, the weak correlation between systemic risk and bank tail risk, as documented by Acharya et al. (2009) and
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016), for example, is a consequence of the very low correlation between the level of bank
tail risk and systemic linkage. A prudential approach focusing solely on bank risk does not incorporate the impact on
systemic linkages. Consequently, such an approach falls short in curtailing a bank's systemic risk.
Third, banks engaging inmore nontraditional banking activities are generally associated with a higher level of systemic
risk, because such banks are linkedmore strongly to the system in financial distress. Hence these nontraditional activities
are relevant from a macroprudential perspective, even though there may seem little reason to be concerned about these
activities from a purely microprudential point of view.
2 DECOMPOSITION OF SYSTEMIC RISK
In this section we discuss our framework for decomposing banks' systemic risk into bank tail risk and systemic linkage.
The subsections discuss successively the systemic riskmeasure, its estimationmethodology, its decomposition of systemic
risk into bank tail risk and systemic linkage, and its relationship to several other systemic risk measures.
2.1 Measure
We measure banks' systemic risk by evaluating their sensitivity to shocks in the financial system. A natural measure for
this would be the coefficient from a linear relationship between indicators of the status of one bank and the system (see,
e.g., Nijskens &Wagner, 2011). However, the relationship between financial institutions and the financial systemmay be
quite different for small fluctuations and severe shocks (see, e.g., Bartram et al., 2007; Knaup&Wagner, 2012; Fahlenbrach
et al., 2012). Usually, systemic risk in the banking literature refers to large, adverse shocks in the financial system, and not
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to the everyday occurrence of small fluctuations. Therefore, we consider a linear relationship between the equity returns
of a financial institution and the financial system conditional upon extremely adverse shocks in the financial system.4
Let Ri and Rs denote the stock return of bank i and the return on an equity investment in the financial system. We
measure the systemic risk of bank i by the coefficient 𝛽Ti in the following linear tail model:
Ri = 𝛽Ti Rs + 𝜀i, for Rs < −VaRs(p̄), (1)
where VaRs(p̄) is the “value-at-risk” of an equity investment in the financial system,which is defined as the loss on a dollar
investment that is exceeded with some small probability p̄—that is, VaRs(p̄) ∶= − sup{c ∶ Pr(Rs ≤ c) ≤ p̄}, and where
𝜀i represents the shocks from other sources which are assumed to be independent of the shocks in the financial system
represented by Rs. The index T indicates that coefficient 𝛽Ti describes the relationship between bank i and the financial
system only in the event of extremely adverse shocks in the financial system—that is, only if Rs < −VaRs(p̄). Hence the
linear tail model in Equation 1 does not make any assumptions on the relationship between the bank and the financial
system under normal conditions.
The coefficient 𝛽Ti could be regarded as a systemic risk measure by construction: Banks with a higher 𝛽
T
i are expected to
suffer from larger capital losses in the event of an extremely adverse shock in the financial system. As mentioned before,
this measure does not reveal the underlying cause of the comovement. Note, however, that, regardless of the underlying
cause, stronger comovement with severe shocks in the financial system indicates that an institution is more likely to face
difficulties when it is most costly to the real economy—that is, in the event of a widespread disruption of the financial
system.5 Hence the regulator may even be concerned with banks suffering passively from systemic shocks, because such
banks impose a larger expected cost on the real economy in a potential crisis (see, e.g., Acharya & Yorulmazer, 2007;
Acharya et al., 2017; Dàvila & Korinek, 2018; Wagner, 2010).6
2.2 Estimation
The main difficulty in estimating coefficient 𝛽Ti is the small number of observations corresponding to extremely adverse
shocks in the financial system. Given some low probability p̄, only a few observations correspond to the tail scenario
Rs ≤ −VaRs(p̄). Therefore, there is a risk of large estimation uncertainty when estimating 𝛽Ti from a small subset of
observations by applying conventional methods such as an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (see, e.g., Mikosch
& De Vries, 2013). Instead, we estimate 𝛽Ti using an EVT approach. Van Oordt and Zhou (2017) propose an estimator
of 𝛽Ti based on EVT in a heavy-tailed environment. This estimator of 𝛽
T
i has a smaller mean squared error than an OLS
regression if the estimation is based on a few tail observations only. Van Oordt and Zhou (2016) apply this methodology in
an asset pricing framework and show that estimates are relatively persistent over time and that historical estimates help
to predict which stocks suffer relatively large losses in market crashes.
We assume the heavy-tailedness of financial returns as documented in the literature (see, e.g., Embrechts et al., 1997;
Jansen & De Vries, 1991). Let Ri and Rs follow heavy-tailed distributions with tail indices 𝜁 i and 𝜁 s, respectively.7 Under
mild conditions, Van Oordt and Zhou (2017) derive for 𝛽Ti ≥ 0 that
𝛽Ti = limp→0 𝜏i(p)
1∕𝜁s VaRi(p)
VaRs(p)
, (2)
where VaRi(p) and VaRs(p) are the value-at-risks of Ri and Rs with probability level p, and 𝜏 i(p) is the level of tail
dependence between Ri and Rs defined as
𝜏i(p) ∶= Pr(Ri < −VaRi(p)|Rs < −VaRs(p)). (3)
4In Section 4.5 we discuss the value-added of our approach vis-à-vis an unconditional linear model.
5For empirical evidence on the real effects of financial crises we refer to Peek and Rosengren (2000), Boyd et al. (2005), Dell'Ariccia et al. (2008), Hall
(2010), and references therein. Implicitly, we presume that it is important to avoid financial instability because of the cost it imposes on the real economy.
6The directionality of shock propagation is important if, for example, it is the purpose to assess whether the bailout of one institution will reduce losses
at other financial institutions.
7A distribution is called heavy tailed if it decays at power-law speed in the tail. Formally, for Ri it means Pr(Ri < −u) = u−𝜁i li(u) with limu→∞ li(tu)li(u) = 1
for all t > 1.
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Empirically, all components in Equation 2 can be estimated by existing estimators in EVT. The estimator of 𝛽T is thus
given by combining the estimators of its components, as follows. With n observations on the pair (Ri,Rs), we consider the
tail region as the k worst observations. The coefficient 𝛽Ti is then estimated by
𝛽Ti ∶= 𝜏i(k∕n)
1∕𝜁s V̂aRi(k∕n)
V̂aRs(k∕n)
, (4)
where the tail index 𝜁s is the estimator proposed in Hill (1975), V̂aRi(k∕n) and V̂aRs(k∕n) are estimated by the (k + 1)th
worst return on the bank's stock and the financial index, and 𝜏i(k∕n) is the nonparametric estimator of 𝜏i =∶ limp→0𝜏i(p)
established in multivariate EVT (see Embrechts et al., 2000). The estimator 𝛽Ti is consistent and asymptotically normal,
even under temporal dependence such as volatility clustering, provided that k is a sequence depending on n such that
k ∶= k(n) → +∞ and k(n)∕n → 0 as n → +∞ (see Van Oordt & Zhou, 2017). In practice, samples are finite and k
is fixed at a certain level. The choice of a low k results in a large estimation uncertainty, while choosing a high k results
in a potential estimation bias. The results that we present below are not very sensitive to the choice of k. In our baseline
results, we fix k = 40 using an estimation window of 4 years of daily returns. This corresponds to k∕n ≈ 4%, which is
similar to the level of k∕n in other studies.8 Our results and the micro- and macroprudential implications are robust to
equivalent realistic choices of k. More specifically, the estimation results do not change much when setting a level of k
in the range from 20 to 80 instead (available in the Supporting Information Appendix), but the explained variance and
statistical significance of the regressionmodels dropwhen setting k as low as 10 (such a low level of k results in a relatively
high level of estimation uncertainty).9
2.3 Decomposition
We assess how bank characteristics are related to a bank's sensitivity to severe shocks in the financial system, in particular,
by being related to a bank's tail risk and/or to a bank's systemic linkage.We address such a distinction by decomposing the
systemic risk measure 𝛽Ti and its estimator into two components that represent measures of bank tail risk and systemic
linkage, respectively. Consider the logarithmic transformation of the estimator of 𝛽Ti in Equation 2 as
log 𝛽Ti = log 𝜏i(k∕n)
1∕𝜁s + log V̂aRi(k∕n)
V̂aRs(k∕n)
=∶ log SLi + log IRi. (5)
Hence the sensitivity to extreme shocks is determined by two components: IRi = VaRi(p)∕VaRs(p) and SLi = 𝜏i(p)1∕𝜁s .
The discussion below shows that these two components measure the two dimensions of systemic risk.
The first component, IRi, is the ratio between the VaR of bank i and that of the financial index. Since the denominator
VaRs(p) is homogeneous across all financial institutions, the cross-sectional variation in this component is solely due to
the variation in the tail risks of individual banks, the VaRi(p)s. Hence this component measures the level of bank tail risk,
but carries no information on whether the tail risk of that bank is related to severe shocks in the financial system. In our
sample, this component bears the value 1.65 on average, implying that an equity investment in a single institution bears,
on average, 65% more tail risk than the same investment in the financial index.
The second component, SLi, measures the strength of the link between the bank and the system in financial distress.
Cross-sectional differences in this component are solely due to the variation across different banks in the measure of
tail dependence, the 𝜏 i(p)s. Similar to the correlation coefficient, the level of 𝜏 i(p) is independent of the distribution of
the bank's tail risk—that is, the distribution of Ri.10 Therefore, it contains information only on the dependence between
extreme shocks in the financial system and severe losses suffered by a particular bank, without being affected by the level
of bank tail risk. Hence it bears information on systemic linkage only. Moreover, a simple interpretation of the systemic
8See, for example, Jansen and De Vries (1991) (k∕n = 260∕6, 000 and 12∕294) and Longin and Solnik (2001) (k∕n around 4–5%).
9The level ofn is determined by the length of the estimationwindow.Our choice for the length of the estimationwindow is in linewith the commonprac-
tice in the EVT literature of using a relatively long estimation horizon to achieve a relatively low estimation uncertainty (e.g., 4 or 5 years). Nevertheless,
the results remain qualitatively unchanged when using an estimation window of 2 years instead (see the Supporting Information Appendix).
10It is easily verified that the level of 𝜏 i(p) in Equation 3 is unaffected by any monotonic transformation (with a strictly increasing function) of the
marginal distribution of the bank returns, the Ris. For example, with RB = 2RA, we have VaRB(p) = 2VaRA(p), which implies 𝜏A(p) = Pr(RA <
−VaRA(p)|Rs < −VaRs(p)) = Pr(2RA < −2VaRA(p)|Rs < −VaRs(p)) = Pr(RB < −VaRB(p)|Rs < −VaRs(p)) = 𝜏B(p).
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linkage, SLi, is the fraction of banks' tail risk that is associated with severe shocks in the financial system.11 In our sample,
this fraction is 60% on average.
From the discussion above, the subcomponent IRi measures the tail risk of bank i, while the subcomponent SLi mea-
sures the systemic linkage of bank i. In total, the log of the estimated systemic risk measure, 𝛽Ti , equals the sum of the log
of the systemic linkage measure and the log of the bank's tail risk measure.
2.4 Relationship to other measures
In a broader context, the 𝛽Ti closely relates to several other measures that, based on the categorization of Benoit et al.
(2017), follow a global approach to measuring systemic risk, such as MES, SRISK and Exposure CoVaR.
We start with a comparison to the tail dependence measure, 𝜏 i(p), defined in Equation 3. Several papers directly rely
on tail dependence as a proxy of systemic risk (see, e.g., Balla et al., 2014; De Jonghe, 2010; Hartmann et al., 2007; Weiß
et al., 2014; Zhou, 2010).12 The level of tail dependence is only related to one of the two subcomponents of 𝛽Ti as discussed
in the previous subsection. As a consequence, two banks with the same levels of tail dependence but different levels of
marginal risk may exhibit considerable differences in their responses to severe shocks in the financial system.
There is a strong analogy between 𝛽Ti and the MES measure of Acharya et al. (2009, 2017). With the MESi defined as
the expected loss of bank i conditional upon a severe shock in the financial system, it is straightforward to derive from
the assumed linear tail model in Equation 1 that, for p < p̄,
MESi(p) ∶= −E[Ri|Rs ≤ −VaRs(p)] = −𝛽Ti E[Rs|Rs ≤ −VaRs(p)] = 𝛽Ti ESs(p), (6)
where ESs(p) denotes the expected shortfall of Rs defined as ESs(p) = −E[Rs|Rs ≤ −VaRs(p)]. The expected shortfall of
the financial system, ESs(p), is the same for each and every bank. Hence any dispersion in the MESi across institutions
is because of cross-sectional differences in 𝛽Ti . In other words, the 𝛽
T
i provides a full description of the cross-sectional
variation inMESi, but it abstracts from potential time variation in the level of tail risk in the financial system as measured
by the expected shortfall, ESs(p).
The 𝛽Ti is also related to the SRISKmeasure of Brownlees and Engle (2017) as a consequence of the relationship between
SRISKandMES.13 Let cdenote theminimummarket-based capital ratio atwhich the bank is believed to be in a sufficiently
good shape. Then SRISK is defined as the expected shortfall relative to that minimum level, conditional upon a sys-
temic event. With the systemic event defined as an adverse shock in the financial system14 that occurs with probability p,
we have
SRISKi(p) ∶= −E
[
c (Di +Wi) −Wi|RLRs ≤ −VaRLRs (p)] , (7)
where the book value of debt is denoted byDi, the market capitalization is denoted byWi, and the superscript LR denotes
the fact that SRISK usually conditions upon a long-run stress event, such as 6 months. Acharya et al. (2012) estimate the
long-runMES (LRMES) from the dailyMESi(p) by applying a scaling factorCLR as LRMESi(p) ≈ CLR×MESi(p). Following
this approximation, the relationship of SRISK to 𝛽Ti can be expressed as
SRISKi(p) ≈ cDi − (1 − c)
(
1 − 𝛽Ti C
LRESs(p)
)
Wi. (8)
Hence, compared with MESi, the cross-sectional variation in the level of SRISKi depends not only on the cross-sectional
variation in 𝛽Ti but, by definition, also on the differences in bank size and financial leverage.
11Suppose the tail risk of bank 1 is completely associated with severe shocks in the financial system (and no other sources of risk). Then VaR1(p) =
𝛽T1 VaRs(p). Hence, in general, 𝛽Ti VaRs(p) could be interpreted as the “quantity of banks' tail risk that is associated with severe shocks in the finan-
cial system.” From Equation 4 we have 𝜏i(k∕n)1∕𝜁s V̂aRi(k∕n) = 𝛽Ti V̂aRs(k∕n). Hence the “fraction” 𝜏i(k∕n)1∕𝜁s of banks' tail risk V̂aRi(k∕n) meets this
interpretation.
12For two early applications in the context of asset return linkages; see Hartmann et al. (2004) and Straetmans et al. (2008).
13Another measure that is closely related to the MES is the component expected shortfall (CES) of Banulescu and Dumitrescu (2015). The CESi is
defined as the expected loss of bank i as a share of the total losses in the system conditional upon a severe shock in the financial system. It relates to 𝛽Ti
as 𝛽Ti Wi∕Ws, whereWi andWs are the market capitalizations of bank i and the entire financial system, respectively.14Having Rs representing the return on the financial index follows the conceptual discussion of Acharya et al. (2013, pp. 179–181). Allen et al. (2012)
provide evidence that the level of tail risk in the financial system based on stock returns helped to forecast macroeconomic downturns, while the tail
risk among nonfinancial firms had no marginal predictive ability. Similarly, Giglio et al. (2016) observed return volatility in the financial sector to be
a significant predictor of macroeconomic tail risk, whereas nonfinancial volatility was not. Alternatively, Rs could represent the return on a broader
market index.
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Finally, we discuss the relationship to the Exposure CoVaR measure of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016). The Expo-
sure CoVaR is computed as the banks' VaR conditional upon the system suffering a loss equal to the system's own VaR.
Formally, for a given probability level p, the Exposure CoVaR of bank i is implicitly defined as
Pr(Ri < −Exposure CoVaRi(p)|Rs = −VaRs(p)) = p. (9)
The following lemma shows how the Exposure CoVaRi relates to 𝛽Ti and its two subcomponents.
Lemma 1. Assume that the linear model in Equation 1 holds true for all Rs, that both Rs and 𝜀i follow a heavy-tailed
distribution with tail index 𝜉s, and that 𝜏i = limp→0𝜏i(p). Then, as p → 0, we have
Exposure CoVaRi(p) ∼
(
𝜏
1∕𝜉s
i + (1 − 𝜏i)
1∕𝜉s
)
VaRi(p) ∼ 𝛽Ti VaRs(p)T(𝜏i, 𝜉s), (10)
where
T(𝜏i, 𝜉s) = 1 +
(
1
𝜏i
− 1
)1∕𝜉s
. (11)
Lemma 1 reveals that the Exposure CoVaRi is not a monotonic increasing function with respect to 𝜏 i.15 For a given
VaRi(p), it increases on [0, 1∕2], whereas it decreases on [1∕2, 1]. For both 𝜏 i = 0 and 𝜏 i = 1, the Exposure CoVaRi will
equal the bank's VaR.
Moreover, the level of bank-specific risk turns out to be relevant for the level of Exposure CoVaRi. Equation 10 shows
that the Exposure CoVaRi increases in the level of VaRi(p) even if 𝜏 i = 0. This is in contrast to 𝛽Ti and MESi, which are
both independent of the level of bank-specific risk.
Finally, the empirical relationships of bank characteristics to 𝛽Ti or MESi can be different from their relationships to
Exposure CoVaRi. The level of Exposure CoVaRi not only depends on the level of 𝛽Ti but also on an additional trans-
formation of the level of tail dependence—that is, T(𝜏 i, 𝜉s) in Equation 11. The relationship of bank characteristics to
Exposure CoVaRi can be weaker or stronger depending on how bank characteristics relate to T(𝜏 i, 𝜉s). We will assess this
relationship in the empirical analysis.
3 EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
To explore the empirical relationship between systemic risk and characteristics of bank business models, we estimate
three regression models using as dependent variables our estimates of, respectively, systemic risk, systemic linkage, and
bank tail risk.
3.1 Regression models
The dependent variables in the regression models are estimated for each bank i using daily data from 16-quarter rolling
windows. With the 16-quarter rolling window denoted by t to t + 15, the estimates are denoted as 𝛽Ti;[t,t+15], SLi;[t,t+15]
and IRi;[t,t+15]. The regressions are estimated using bank characteristics in the quarter directly preceding the estimation
window. These bank characteristics are denoted by Xi;t− 1. Hence we estimate the coefficients in the following models
from panel data:
log 𝛽Ti;[t,t+15] = 𝛼1t + Xi;t−1𝜃 + 𝜐it, (12a)
log SLi;[t,t+15] = 𝛼2t + Xi;t−1𝛿 + 𝜉it, (12b)
log IRi;[t,t+15] = 𝛼3t + Xi;t−1𝛾 + 𝜈it, (12c)
where 𝛼1t, 𝛼2t, and 𝛼3t are time fixed effects and where 𝜐it, 𝜉it, and 𝜈it are the error terms. The time fixed effects capture
variation in macroeconomic state variables as well as other sources of common variation in systemic risk over time.
Moreover, we do not include bank fixed effects in our baseline model. The reason is that, in particular, the systemic
linkage is relatively persistent over time (the Supporting Information Appendix provides some evidence that systemic
15We show in the Supporting Information Appendix that Equation 10 in Lemma 1 also holds true in a much more general setting. This more general
setting encompasses, for example, a segmented linear model such that the linear model in Equation 1 holds true for Rs < −VaRs(p̄), and the relationship
equals Ri = 𝛽NTi Rs + 𝜀i for some coefficient 𝛽
NT
i ≥ 0 (where the superscript NT indicates that it could be different from 𝛽
T
i ) if Rs ≥ −VaRs(p̄).
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linkage is a significant predictor of 𝛽Ti with a lag of 12 years). Owing to this persistency, fixed effects will absorb most of
the variation in the systemic linkage in our data. Therefore, we exclude bank fixed effects for our purpose, which is in
line with the empirical strategy of De Jonghe (2010), who investigated the relationship between bank characteristics and
tail dependence. However, the robustness checks in the Supporting Information Appendix do consider bank fixed effects.
Finally, to deal with the serial correlation in the error terms over time and the cross-sectional correlation in the error
terms at the same point in time, we estimate standard errors that are clustered on both the bank and time level.
Estimating the coefficients 𝛿 and ?̂? reveals how the interrelationships between bank characteristics and 𝛽Ti;[t,t+15] can
be attributed to the interrelationships between bank characteristics and the two subcomponents of systemic risk. The
dependent variable in the model in Equation 12a equals the sum of those in Equations 12b and 12c. Hence, theoretically,
it holds true that 𝜃 = 𝛾 + 𝛿. This relationship also holds true empirically—that is, ?̂? = ?̂? + 𝛿—because we estimate the
models in Equations 12a–12c equation by equation using least squares panel regressions. Therefore, we can also assess
how the interrelationships between bank characteristics and the two dimensions of systemic risk contribute quantitatively
to the relationship between bank characteristics and the level of systemic risk.16
3.2 Data
We use equity returns to calculate the systemic risk measure and its subcomponents. For that purpose, we collect stock
market data fromCRSP onUS BHCs from 1992 to 2011. At the end of each quarter, we use 4 years of historical daily equity
returns to estimate the three dependent variables, the 𝛽Ti;[t,t+15] and its two subcomponents. To guarantee the quality of the
data and the liquidity of the stocks on the equity market, the selected banks have total assets of at least USD 500 million
and nonzero returns on at least 60% of the days in the estimation window. We use a broad financial index based on the
daily value weighted returns of firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999, which covers firms in banking, insurance,
real estate, and trading.17
Across all banks and all periods, we observe an average 𝛽Ti;[t,t+15] of 0.97 in our sample. In an extreme market downturn,
the average loss in bank equity returns is thus comparable with the loss in the financial index. The coefficient 𝛽Ti;[t,t+15]
ranges from 0.14 to 3.58, demonstrating large differences in the sensitivity of banks' capital losses to large shocks in the
financial system. The SLi;[t,t+15], which measures the strength of the link between the bank and the system in the event of
widespread financial distress, ranges from 0.19 to 0.92. The variation illustrates the role that systemic linkage plays in the
variation of 𝛽Ti;[t,t+15]. The other component, IRi;[t,t+15], compares banks' risk to that of the system and ranges from 0.51 to
7.72. Again, differences in this component demonstrate the role of the risk level in the variation of 𝛽Ti;[t,t+15].
Figure 2a illustrates the relationship between bank tail risk and banks' systemic risk. Although this relationship is
positive, a large fraction of the variation in systemic risk is not explained by the level of bank tail risk alone. The difference
between bank tail risk and systemic risk depends on the linkage between bank tail risk and severe shocks in the financial
system. Figure 2b shows that the relationship between bank tail risk and systemic linkage is relatively weak. In other
words, the two subcomponents provide almost orthogonal information regarding banks' systemic risk. This hints that
sometimes different steps may be necessary to pursue themicro- andmacroprudential objectives of regulation. Moreover,
it cannot be taken for granted that bank characteristics related to bank tail risk are related to systemic linkage in the
same way.
The variables for bank businessmodels are constructed from the FRY-9C reports that aremade publicly available by the
Federal Reserve in linewith the definitions of Baele et al. (2014).18 More specifically, at the end of each quarterwe calculate
the following indicators categorized into four groups. (i) Main characteristics of bank business models: the size of banks
measured by the logarithm of total assets, the CAMEL ratios, and the growth rate of total assets.19 (ii) Indicators of banks'
16We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out that it could be possible to estimate the model in Equation 12c using a quantile regression, since the
cross-sectional variation in the IRi;[t,t+15] component is entirely associated with that of the VaR of each bank. We do not follow this approach, because
it would in general no longer hold true that ?̂? = ?̂? + 𝛿 if ?̂? is estimated with a quantile regression, which would complicate the attribution analysis.
17Available on the website of Kenneth French via the link “38 Industry Portfolios” at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_
library.html.
18For a detailed description of the construction of the bank characteristics with references to the labels of each item in the FR Y-9C reports, see Baele
et al. (2014, appendix A). Two exceptions are that we estimate our models with the tangible equity ratio and a more narrow definition of liquid assets
(US treasuries, currency, noninterest bearing balances, and interest-bearing balances).
19Here the CAMEL ratios are Capital (tangible equity capital ratio), Asset quality (nonperforming loans ratio), Management (cost-to-income ratio),
Earnings (return on total equity), and Liquidity (liquid assets ratio).
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(a) (b)
FIGURE 2 Bank tail risk and systemic risk. The figure shows the relationship between bank tail risk and, respectively, systemic risk (left
panel) and systemic linkage (right panel) in 2007:Q4. Bank systemic risk is measured as 𝛽Ti . Bank tail risk and bank systemic linkage are
measured as IRi and SLi; for definitions, see Equation 5 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
income sources (as a ratio to total income): shares of noninterest income, fiduciary activities income, service charges
on deposit accounts, trading revenue and other noninterest income. (iii) Indicators of banks' loan decompositions: the
loans-to-total-assets ratio, the real estate loan share, the agricultural loan share, the commercial and industrial loan share,
the consumer loan share, and other loan share. Except for the loans-to-total-assets ratio, these indicators are calculated
as shares of total loans. (iv) An indicator of banks' funding structures: the deposit funding gap, defined as the difference
between the loans-to-total-assets ratio and the deposits-to-total-assets ratio.
For each BHC in our sample, we match its stock market data with the corresponding characteristics of bank business
models. The link between stock market data and the FR Y-9C reports is based on the match provided by the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York.20 We regress the systemic risk measure and its subcomponents on the characteristics of bank
business models in the quarter preceding the 4-year estimation window.21 The estimation windows for the left-hand-side
variables range from 1992:Q3–1996:Q2 to 2008:Q1–2011:Q4. In addition, we exclude all observations corresponding to a
zero estimate of 𝛽Ti;[t,t+15], because our regression models require taking logarithms of the estimated 𝛽
T
i;[t,t+15].
22 We end up
with 13,498 bank-quarter observations.
The descriptive statistics (available in the Supporting Information Appendix) look similar to those of Baele et al. (2014).
To eliminate the impact of potential outliers, all variables are constructed after winsorizing at 1% and 99% quantiles of the
whole sample. Return on equity is annualized. All variables except total assets are in ratios. For the level of total assets, we
take the logarithmic transformation in thousands of USD. Following Baele et al. (2014, appendix A), we first regress the
logarithm of total assets on the other regressors, and then use the residuals as our right-hand-side variable for bank size.
The rationale is that banks' choices regarding their business models directly impact their size. The estimated coefficients
for all other characteristics of bank business models measure, as a consequence of this procedure, not only their direct
effect on the dependent variables but also their indirect effect through bank size (as if bank size were not included as a
regressor). The procedure does not affect the estimated coefficient for bank size.
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In the baseline specification we estimate the relationships in Equations 12a–12c for the CAMEL ratios, bank size, asset
growth, noninterest income share, loans to assets, and deposits to assets. Table 1 presents the baseline results. Table 2
reports estimates using a further decomposition into different sources of noninterest income. Table 3 shows the results
while controlling for conventional risk measures.
20Available at http://www.ny.frb.org/research/banking_research/datasets.html.
21In the Supporting Information Appendix we provide results when regressing the estimated 𝛽Ti;[t,t+15]s on bank characteristics averaged over the 16
quarterly observations within the 4-year estimation window as well as on bank characteristics in the two quarters before the estimation window.
22In the Supporting Information Appendix we verify the impact of excluding observations corresponding to zero 𝛽Ti;[t,t+15] estimates.
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TABLE 1 Baseline results on systemic risk
(1) (2) (3)
Variables log ?̂?Ti ;[t,t+𝟏𝟓] logSLi;[t,t+𝟏𝟓] logIRi;[t,t+𝟏𝟓]
Bank size (reslnTAt− 1) 0.072*** 0.121*** -0.049***
(0.013) (0.007) (0.011)
Tangible equity ratiot− 1 -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.001
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Nonperforming-loans ratiot− 1 3.223*** -0.211 3.434***
(0.905) (0.746) (0.721)
Cost-to-income ratiot− 1 -0.631*** -0.742*** 0.111
(0.126) (0.069) (0.107)
Return on equityt− 1 -0.462** -0.055 -0.408**
(0.197) (0.113) (0.185)
Liquid assetst− 1 -0.054 0.114 -0.168
(0.185) (0.151) (0.179)
Deposit funding gapt− 1 0.190* 0.242*** -0.052
(0.103) (0.068) (0.093)
Loans to total assetst− 1 -0.091 -0.197** 0.106
(0.103) (0.082) (0.085)
Noninterest income sharet− 1 0.585*** 0.668*** -0.084
(0.084) (0.055) (0.075)
Growth in total assetst− 1 0.264*** 0.057 0.207***
(0.061) (0.040) (0.048)
Constant 0.775*** -0.005 0.780***
(0.146) (0.088) (0.126)
Observations 13,498 13,498 13,498
Number of banks 510 510 510
R-squared 0.319 0.491 0.363
Partial R-squared 0.178 0.454 0.083
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Clustering at bank level Yes Yes Yes
Clustering at time level Yes Yes Yes
Note. The definitions of the dependent variables are provided in Equations 4 and 5. The
dependent variables are calculated from 16 quarters of daily stock market returns, with a
quarterly rolling window. The explanatory variables are observed in the quarter preceding
the estimation horizon. They are all ratios, except bank size. Bank size is the residual from
a regression of the logarithm of total assets on the other regressors. The “partial R-squared”
is calculated as 1−(1−R2)∕(1−R2D), where R
2 is the R-squared in the table and where R2D is
the R-squared from a regression with only dummies for the fixed effects. Asterisks indicate
significance at the *10%, **5%, and ***1% levels.
4.1 Size
We find that larger banks tend to be more sensitive to severe shocks in the financial system. Table 1, Model (1) suggests
that banks with twice as many total assets have a 𝛽Ti that is, on average, about 6% (≈ 2
0.080 − 1) higher. This is not the
result of a positive relationship of bank size to bank tail risk. We observe a small but significant negative association with
bank tail risk. The tail risk of banks with twice as many assets is, on average, approximately 2% lower; see Table 1, Model
(3). Instead, it is the stronger systemic linkage that induces the higher sensitivity of large banks to severe shocks in the
financial system. The results in Table 1, Model (2) support an 8% higher level of systemic linkage for banks with twice as
many assets.
Our results are consistent with the view that large banks may be associated with lower risk because of better diversi-
fication (see, e.g., Demsetz and Strahan, 1997). Even though better diversified banks face lower risks individually, they
can ultimately be associated with more systemic risk (see, e.g., Shaffer, 1994; Wagner, 2010). Moreover, “too-big-to-fail”
institutions may enjoy (implicit) guarantees that encourage them to weight their portfolios further towards risks that are
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TABLE 2 Systemic risk and sources of noninterest income
(1) (2) (3)
Variables log ?̂?Ti;[t,t+𝟏𝟓] logSLi;[t,t+𝟏𝟓] logIRi;[t,t+𝟏𝟓]
Bank size (reslnTAt− 1) 0.070*** 0.120*** -0.050***
(0.013) (0.007) (0.010)
Tangible equity ratiot− 1 -0.029*** -0.025*** -0.004
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Nonperforming-loans ratiot− 1 3.066*** 0.028 3.038***
(0.874) (0.740) (0.685)
Cost-to-income ratiot− 1 -0.600*** -0.694*** 0.095
(0.129) (0.068) (0.106)
Return on equityt− 1 -0.414** 0.052 -0.466**
(0.198) (0.115) (0.182)
Liquid assetst− 1 -0.043 -0.028 -0.015
(0.189) (0.159) (0.176)
Deposit funding gapt− 1 0.141 0.335*** -0.194**
(0.110) (0.071) (0.090)
Loans to total assetst− 1 -0.049 -0.260*** 0.211***
(0.109) (0.083) (0.081)
Growth in total assetst− 1 0.244*** 0.100** 0.143***
(0.058) (0.039) (0.045)
Fiduciary activities income sharet− 1 0.496*** 0.849*** -0.353***
(0.142) (0.091) (0.127)
Service charges on dep. accounts sharet− 1 0.114 1.294*** -1.180***
(0.253) (0.191) (0.203)
Trading revenue sharet− 1 1.377*** 1.583*** -0.206
(0.456) (0.334) (0.381)
Other noninterest income sharet− 1 0.565*** 0.522*** 0.043
(0.101) (0.066) (0.071)
Constant 0.746*** -0.043 0.789***
(0.148) (0.089) (0.120)
Observations 13,498 13,498 13,498
Number of banks 510 510 510
R-squared 0.321 0.502 0.386
Partial R-squared 0.180 0.466 0.117
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Clustering at bank level Yes Yes Yes
Clustering at time level Yes Yes Yes
Note. The definitions of the dependent variables are provided in Equations 4 and 5. The dependent vari-
ables are calculated from 16 quarters of daily stock market returns, with a quarterly rolling window. The
explanatory variables are observed in the quarter preceding the estimation horizon. They are all ratios,
except bank size. Bank size is the residual from a regression of the logarithm of total assets on the other
regressors. The “partial R-squared” is calculated as 1−(1−R2)∕(1−R2D), where R
2 is the R-squared in the
table and where R2D is the R-squared from a regression with only dummies for the fixed effects. Asterisks
indicate significance at the *10%, **5%, and ***1% levels.
expensive to insure privately (systematic risks) (see, e.g., Penati and Protopapadakis, 1988; Pennacchi, 2006).23 This may
explain the positive relationship that we observe for systemic risk and systemic linkage.
Our findings are in line with those in earlier studies. For example, Demsetz and Strahan (1997), Pais and Stork (2013),
and Tabak et al. (2013) did not observe a positive association between size and bank risk, while a positive relationship
between bank size and systemic risk has also been reported by López-Espinosa et al. (2012), Brunnermeier et al. (2012),
23These incentives may be weaker for very large institutions, because bailing them out may not be feasible if public finances are weak (see, e.g., Acharya
et al., 2014; Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 2013).
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TABLE 3 Results after controlling for normal risk measures
(1) (2) (3)
Variables log ?̂?Ti;[t,t+𝟏𝟓] logSLi;[t,t+𝟏𝟓] logIRi;[t,t+𝟏𝟓]
log 𝜌i;[t,t+15] 0.168*** 0.171*** -0.003
(0.010) (0.010) (0.003)
log(𝜎i;[t,t+15]∕𝜎i;[t,t+15]) 0.933*** -0.035* 0.968***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.013)
Bank size (reslnTAt− 1) 0.033*** 0.036*** -0.003
(0.006) (0.005) (0.002)
Tangible equity ratiot− 1 -0.012*** -0.013*** 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Nonperforming-loans ratiot− 1 -0.120 0.140 -0.260
(0.408) (0.400) (0.192)
Cost-to-income ratiot− 1 -0.217*** -0.228*** 0.011
(0.047) (0.044) (0.019)
Return on equityt− 1 -0.134 -0.162** 0.029
(0.083) (0.072) (0.035)
Liquid assetst− 1 -0.009 0.017 -0.026
(0.094) (0.099) (0.033)
Deposit funding gapt− 1 0.121*** 0.141*** -0.021
(0.041) (0.037) (0.020)
Loans to total assetst− 1 -0.075 -0.112*** 0.037*
(0.048) (0.041) (0.020)
Noninterest income sharet− 1 0.257*** 0.263*** -0.006
(0.038) (0.038) (0.016)
Growth in total assetst− 1 0.000 -0.006 0.007
(0.025) (0.023) (0.013)
Constant -0.102** -0.024 -0.078***
(0.051) (0.047) (0.028)
Observations 13,293 13,293 13,293
Number of banks 506 506 506
R-squared 0.807 0.713 0.943
Partial R-squared 0.767 0.691 0.917
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Clustering at bank level Yes Yes Yes
Clustering at time level Yes Yes Yes
Note. The definitions of the dependent variables are provided in Equations 4 and 5. The
dependent variables are calculated from 16 quarters of daily stock market returns, with a
quarterly rolling window. The 𝜌i;[t,t+15], 𝜎i;[t,t+15] and 𝜎s;[t,t+15] are the correlation between
Ri and Rs, and the standard deviations of, respectively, Ri and Rs, all estimated over the
same horizon as the dependent variables. All other explanatory variables are observed in
the quarter preceding the estimation horizon. They are all ratios, except bank size. Bank
size is the residual from a regression of the logarithm of total assets on the other regressors.
The “partial R-squared” is calculated as 1− (1−R2)∕(1−R2D), where R
2 is the R-squared in
the table and where R2D is the R-squared from a regression with only dummies for the fixed
effects. Asterisks indicate significance at the *10%, **5%, and ***1% levels.
Vallascas and Keasey (2012), and Girardi and Ergün (2013). Moreover, the positive relationship between bank size and
tail dependence has also been documented by De Jonghe (2010) and Pais and Stork (2013).
4.2 Noninterest income
We find a strong positive relationship between banks' reliance on noninterest income and their sensitivity to severe shocks
in the financial system. A noninterest-income share that is 10 percentage points higher corresponds to an approximately
5.8% higher 𝛽Ti . This is in line with the findings of Brunnermeier et al. (2012) and Vallascas and Keasey (2012) on systemic
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risk. Moreover, Stiroh (2006b) reports a positive relationship between financial firms' reliance on noninterest income
and their market betas (“systematic risk”). The observed positive relationship between noninterest income share and the
sensitivity to severe financial shocks is mainly due to a stronger linkage in stress events. De Jonghe (2010) and Vallascas
and Keasey (2012) documented a similar positive relationship between tail dependence and the reliance on noninterest
income.
We do not observe a positive relationship between the noninterest-income share and the level of bank tail risk, although
several other studies report a positive relationship between noninterest income and volatility (see, e.g., Lepetit et al.,
2008; Stiroh, 2006a).24 In Table 2 we explore a decomposition of noninterest income. The results for Model (3) show that
service charges to deposit accounts and income from fiduciary activities, such as wealth management, are responsible for
a negative relationship between the noninterest income share and bank tail risk. In contrast, we observe no significant
relationship between bank tail risk and trading revenue or bank tail risk and other noninterest income, which includes,
for example, investment banking, venture capital revenues, and net-gains-on-loans sales. Nevertheless, banks with more
trading revenue and other noninterest income are much more strongly related to the system in the event of financial
stress. Therefore, these activities are strongly positively related to banks' systemic risk (see also Brunnermeier et al., 2012).
4.3 Traditionality of balance sheets
In the traditional business model, banks attract deposits and invest in loans. Following this traditional banking model,
banks' balance sheets are thus financed with deposits and characterized by relatively high loans-to-assets ratios. If tra-
ditional activities are more isolated from the risk in the financial system, then the traditionality of bank balance sheets
would be associated with a lower systemic linkage, and potentially, with lower systemic risk.
First we consider the loans-to-assets ratio as a proxy of the traditionality of the bank balance sheets. FromTable 1,Model
(1) we observe that banks with a loans-to-assets ratio that is 10 percentage points higher are associated with a 2.0% lower
level of systemic linkage. Hence banks that concentrate their business models towards traditional lending are associated
with a weaker systemic linkage. However, the relationship to 𝛽Ti is not significant, partly because of a weakly significant
positive association between the loans-to-assets ratio and bank tail risk.
Whether the loan business is associated with higher systemic riskmay depend on the risk profile of the loan portfolio.25
By considering the nonperforming-loans ratio as a proxy of the general risk profile of the loan portfolio, we find that
higher levels of risk in the loan portfolio is associated with higher levels of bank tail risk. This is in line with the positive
association betweennonperforming loans ratios and the level of volatility documented, for example, by Stiroh (2006a). The
positive relationship to bank risk drives the positive association between nonperforming loans ratios and systemic risk.
In the traditional business model, lending activities are funded with deposits. The deposit funding gap is an indicator of
the extent to which banks rely on other funding sources for their lending business. From Table 1, Model (1), we observe
that banks with a 10-percentage-point larger deposit funding gap are associated with a 2.4% stronger systemic linkage
and a 1.9% higher level of 𝛽Ti . This is consistent with the study of López-Espinosa et al. (2012), who documented that
short-term wholesale funding increased systemic risk as measured by ΔCoVaR. Similarly, Bologna (2015) documented
that financial institutions with higher deposit funding gaps were more likely to fail during the 2007–2009 crisis period.
Hence we conclude that institutions with a more traditional funding profile tend to be less sensitive to severe shocks in
the system because of a weaker systemic linkage.
Finally, to assess the relationship with the conservativeness of banks' balance sheet expansion, we include asset growth
in the model. The evidence in the literature gives a somewhat mixed view of the impact of banks' expansionary strategies
on their risk. For example, Foos et al. (2010) documented a positive relationship between loan growth and subsequent
loan-loss provisions, while López-Espinosa et al. (2013) did not find a significant relationship between loan growth and
spreads on credit default swaps. Vallascas and Keasey (2012) and López-Espinosa et al. (2013) reported a positive associ-
ation between loan growth and systemic risk. Our results provide some additional evidence: Banks with an asset growth
rate that is 10 percentage points higher are associated with a 2.6% higher 𝛽Ti . This is due to the relationship to bank tail
risk: A 10-percentage-point higher growth rate of assets is associated with an approximately 2.1% higher level of bank
tail risk.
24A difference is that our risk measure focuses explicitly on downward tail risk, which may be different from those based on the entire distribution,
such as volatility.
25The Supporting Information Appendix presents results based on the sectoral decomposition of the loan portfolio.
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4.4 Capital buffers
Bank capital acts as a loss-absorbing buffer. Given the risk of the asset portfolio, higher capital ratios are thus likely to be
associated with lower bank tail risk. Nevertheless, Rochet (1992) showed that the interrelationship between bank capital
and bank risks could be ambiguous if the riskweights used in capital regulationwere not proportional to the actualmarket
risks. Moreover, more equity funding may enable banks to take on more tail risk (see Perotti et al., 2011). Consequently,
the empirical interrelationship between bank capital and systemic risk may be ambiguous.
Our results suggest that bankswith higher capital ratios are associatedwith a significantly lower level of systemic risk. A
tangible equity ratio that is 1 percentage point higher is associated with an approximately 2.9% lower 𝛽Ti . This is the result
of banks with high capital ratios being associated with a weaker systemic linkage. Moreover, banks with a better ability
to replenish capital buffers from retained earnings, because of higher profitability, are considered by investors to bear less
tail risk. The estimation results show that a 1-percentage-point higher return on equity is associated with a 0.4% lower
level of bank risk and, consequently, a 0.4% lower level of 𝛽Ti . In other words, both actual capital buffers and profitability
are negatively related to systemic risk. However, the interrelationships with the two dimensions differ. Banks with higher
actual capital buffers have lower 𝛽Ti s as a result of a weaker systemic linkage, while banks with the ability to build new
capital buffers have lower 𝛽Ti s as a result of a lower level of bank tail risk.
Our findings on the negative relationship between capital buffers and systemic risk are consistent with the general pat-
tern in the empirical literature (see, e.g., Brunnermeier et al., 2012; Vallascas and Keasey, 2012), and weak evidence in
the studies of López-Espinosa et al. (2012) and Girardi and Ergün (2013). The negative relationship to systemic linkage
is consistent with the findings of De Jonghe (2010) and Vallascas and Keasey (2012) on co-exceedances and tail depen-
dence, respectively. Although Stiroh (2006a, 2006b) reported a lower level of volatility for banks with higher capital ratios,
Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) observed a positive relationship between bank capital and tail risk. We observe an insignifi-
cant negative relationship between bank capital and bank tail risks. Moreover, the negative relationship between bank
profitability and tail risk is also supported by the findings of Ellul and Yerramilli. The negative relationship between bank
profit and systemic risk is also consistent with the positive relationship between competition (and hence lower profits)
and systemic risk as documented by Anginer et al. (2014).
4.5 Systemic risk and conventional risk measures
The contribution of our paper is to demonstrate how systemic risk—when measured from a few tail observations
only—can be decomposed into bank tail risk and the strength of the link between the bank and the system in financial
distress. Although it is new to the literature to provide an empirical and theoretical decomposition when estimating sys-
temic risk from a few tail observations, the idea of decomposing systemic risk does appear in the literature. For example,
Acharya et al. (2009) showed that, under the assumption of multivariate normality, the systemic risk of a bank depended
on its standard deviation and its correlation with the system.Moreover, Nijskens andWagner (2011) attributed changes in
the systematic risk of banks to changes in standard deviations and changes in correlation. However, the decompositions
in these studies are based on conventional riskmeasures such as correlation and standard deviations. A remaining empir-
ical question is whether the assessment of systemic risk based on extremes may provide different insights. We address
this question by adding conventional risk measures to our baseline models.
Measuring systemic risk based on extremes is important because interrelationships and risks may change in the event
of large negative shocks in the financial system. By contrast, using conventional riskmeasures, such as standard deviation
and correlation, requires assuming similar dynamics for both large negative shocks and moderate shocks. For example,
assume that the linear relationshipRi = 𝛽 iRs + 𝜀holds independently of whetherRs is extremely negative or not. Thenwe
would have 𝛽Ti = 𝛽i. In this case, estimating 𝛽 i instead of 𝛽
T
i would also provide a good description of the sensitivity of bank
i to large adverse shocks in the financial system. Applying ordinary least squares on all observations gives 𝛽i = ?̂?i×(?̂?i∕?̂?s),
where ?̂?i is the correlation between Ri and Rs and ?̂?i∕?̂?s is the ratio of their standard deviations. Hence a decomposition
of 𝛽i at the log level arises as log 𝛽i = log ?̂?i + log(?̂?i∕?̂?s), where ?̂?i and ?̂?i∕?̂?s are estimated from all observations. Note
that 𝛽i may be subject to less estimation uncertainty than 𝛽Ti , since 𝛽i is estimated using all observations in the estimation
window, whereas the EVT approach to estimating 𝛽Ti only uses a subset of the observations.
When adding log ?̂?i and log(?̂?i∕?̂?s) as additional explanatory variables in our models, the coefficients for bank char-
acteristics can be interpreted as measuring that portion of their effect on the dependent variables that is not measured
through their effect on log ?̂?i and log(?̂?i∕?̂?s) (i.e., the effect while keeping ?̂?i and ?̂?i∕?̂?s constant). Therefore, if the estima-
tion based on extremes provides no new information on the sensitivity of banks to large adverse shocks in the financial
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system, (e.g., because 𝛽Ti = 𝛽i), then adding log ?̂?i and log(?̂?i∕?̂?s) as additional explanatory variables for systemic risk and
its subcomponents is expected to render insignificant the coefficients of the bank characteristics. By contrast, we should
expect coefficients for the bank characteristics to remain significant if part of their effect on log 𝛽Ti cannot be measured
through their effect on log ?̂?i and log(?̂?i∕?̂?s).
Table 3 shows the estimation results after adding the conventional risk measures to our baseline specification. A first
observation is that the model for systemic linkage puts a relatively strong positive weight on the correlation, while the
model for bank tail risk puts a relatively strong positiveweight on the ratio between the standard deviations.Moreover, the
explanatory power of bothmodels increases considerably, especially for themodel on bank tail risk. This suggests that the
standard deviation and correlation carry a considerable amount of information on the two components of systemic risk
that are estimated based on extreme observations only. Apparently, conventional risk measures may provide a relatively
strong signal about the potential values of extreme risk measures in the context of systemic risk.
The relationships between bank characteristics and the subcomponents of systemic risk—while controlling for the
relationship with conventional risk measures—follows from their coefficients in Table 3, Models (2) and (3). Most of
the coefficients of bank characteristics in the model with bank tail risk as the dependent variable become insignificant.
These bank characteristics thus provide little additional information on the level of bank tail risk beyond the information
carried in the conventional riskmeasures. By contrast, many coefficients remain significant after adding the conventional
risk measures to the model for systemic linkage. Hence bank characteristics do provide additional information on the
interrelationship between the bank and the system in financial distress which is not carried in the correlation coefficient.
In particular, banks with larger size, lower capital buffers, and less noninterest income have a stronger link to the system
in financial distress than their correlations would suggest.
The relationship between bank characteristics and systemic risk, while controlling for conventional risk measures,
follows from the extent to which thesemeasures capture bank tail risk and systemic linkage. Table 3,Model (1) shows that
many coefficients remain significant in the model for 𝛽Ti . With the aforementioned results for the subcomponents, the
main reason is the systemic linkage dimension. This suggests that conventional analysis does not capture the relationship
with 𝛽Ti well because of a different dependence structure in the event of extreme shocks in the financial system. This
analysis further supports the importance of broad efforts to properly handle the dependence structure under extreme
market conditions. Examples in this direction are quantile regressions to estimate CoVaR (Adrian&Brunnermeier, 2016),
dynamic conditional correlation models to estimate SRISK (Brownlees & Engle, 2017), and extreme value approaches to
estimate MES (Acharya et al., 2017, Cai et al., 2015).
4.6 Exposure CoVaR
When estimating the relationship between Exposure CoVaRi and bank characteristics, we do not expect to get results
similar to those for 𝛽Ti . The reason is that, as explained in Lemma 1, the Exposure CoVaRi and 𝛽
T
i have a different relation-
ship to the level of tail dependence, but are otherwise comparable. As a consequence, we may expect different estimation
results for Exposure CoVaR when the relationship of bank characteristics to 𝛽Ti is mainly through the systemic linkage
dimension. However, we should expect similar estimation results for bank characteristics that are mainly related to 𝛽Ti
through the bank tail risk dimension.
Table 4, Models (1) and (2) show estimation results for the relationship between bank characteristics and, respectively,
the level of T(𝜏 i, 𝜉s) estimated fromEquation 11 and the bank's Exposure CoVaR estimated fromEquation 10. The T(𝜏 i, 𝜉s)
allows us to obtain the Exposure CoVaRi from the level of 𝛽Ti . Hence the results in Table 4, Model (1) reveal potential
differences in the coefficients of bank characteristics in the regressions with 𝛽Ti and those with Exposure CoVaR.
The estimation results in Table 4 confirm our expectations. Bank characteristics that are mainly related to 𝛽Ti through
the systemic linkage dimension tend to have a weaker relationship to Exposure CoVaR than to 𝛽Ti . Bank characteristics
that are predominantly related to 𝛽Ti via the systemic linkage component often have opposite signs for their relationship
to T(𝜏 i, 𝜉s). For example, larger banks and banks with higher noninterest income shares are associated with lower levels
of T(𝜏 i, 𝜉s), but with higher 𝛽Ti s. As a consequence, bank size and noninterest income do have a weaker relationship to
Exposure CoVaR than to 𝛽Ti ; see Table 4, Model (2). In contrast, characteristics such as the nonperforming-loans ratio
and asset growth, which are mainly related to 𝛽Ti through the bank tail risk dimension (see Table 1), do have very similar
relationships to Exposure CoVaR and to 𝛽Ti .
Finally, the estimated coefficients for the Exposure CoVaR are not very sensitive to the estimation method. Table 4,
Model (3) shows the relationship between bank characteristics when estimating the Exposure CoVaR based on a quantile
regression, as suggested by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016). Broadly speaking, the estimated coefficients are similar to
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TABLE 4 Baseline model with exposure CoVaR
(1) (2) (3)
T(?̂? i;[t,t+𝟏𝟓], ?̂?s;[t,t+𝟏𝟓]) Exposure Exposure
Variables CoVaREVTi;[t,t+𝟏𝟓] CoVaR
QR
i;[t,t+𝟏𝟓]
Bank size (reslnTAt− 1) -0.098*** -0.026** 0.001
(0.006) (0.011) (0.010)
Tangible equity ratiot− 1 0.022*** -0.007 -0.011**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Nonperforming-loans ratiot− 1 0.287 3.560*** 3.664***
(0.596) (0.702) (0.757)
Cost-to-income ratiot− 1 0.615*** -0.019 -0.201*
(0.057) (0.106) (0.105)
Return on equityt− 1 0.078 -0.389** -0.275
(0.092) (0.180) (0.183)
Liquid assetst− 1 -0.095 -0.143 -0.101
(0.117) (0.168) (0.165)
Deposit funding gapt− 1 -0.199*** -0.007 -0.000
(0.055) (0.090) (0.092)
Loans to total assetst− 1 0.171*** 0.080 0.062
(0.066) (0.082) (0.084)
Noninterest income sharet− 1 -0.552*** 0.034 0.155**
(0.045) (0.075) (0.077)
Growth in total assetst− 1 -0.043 0.218*** 0.250***
(0.032) (0.049) (0.052)
Constant 0.396*** 1.747*** 1.652***
(0.069) (0.120) (0.118)
Observations 13,498 13,498 13,498
Number of banks 510 510 510
R-squared 0.499 0.609 0.603
Partial R-squared 0.279 0.581 0.521
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Clustering at bank level Yes Yes Yes
Clustering at time level Yes Yes Yes
Note. The dependent variables T(𝜏 i, 𝜉s) and Exposure CoVaREVTi in Models (1) and (2) are estimated
using Equations 10–11. The dependent variable inModel (3) is calculated as Exposure CoVaRQRi = ?̂?q+
𝛽q×V̂aRs(0.04), where ?̂?q and 𝛽q are obtained from estimating themodel Exposure CoVaRQRi (0.04|Rs) =
𝛼q+𝛽qRs+𝜀q with a quantile regression. All dependent variables are in log levels and are calculated from
16 quarters of daily stock market returns, with a quarterly rolling window. The explanatory variables
are observed in the quarter preceding the estimation horizon. They are all ratios, except bank size. Bank
size is the residual from a regression of the logarithm of total assets on the other regressors. The “partial
R-squared” is calculated as 1−(1−R2)∕(1−R2D), where R
2 is the R-squared in the table and where R2D is
the R-squared from a regression with only dummies for the fixed effects. Asterisks indicate significance
at the *10%, **5%, and ***1% levels.
those in Table 4, Model (2). Nevertheless, we observe some variation in the significance of different characteristics and a
slightly higher explanatory power in the model relying on the approach in Equation 10.
5 POLICY DISCUSSION
Over the past decade, the emphasis of banking regulation has shifted from themicro- towards themacroprudential objec-
tive. The decomposition of systemic risk provides an explanation of why the two objectives can have different implications
for regulation. The decomposition also reveals the interrelationship between the two objectives. As a consequence of the
shift toward the macroprudential objective, regulators have to take an additional dimension into consideration besides
bank risk: the strength of the link between banks and the system in financial distress, or systemic linkage. Empirically,
characteristics of bank business models have different relationships to the two dimensions of systemic risk. These differ-
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FIGURE 3 Bank characteristics and systemic risk. The figure shows the relationship between different bank characteristics and systemic
risk. Dots further to the right (left) of the vertical axis in the center of the figure imply a stronger positive (negative) relationship between that
particular characteristic and bank tail risk. Dots further above (below) the dashed diagonal signify a positive (negative) relationship between
that particular characteristic and systemic risk. A larger distance from the diagonal signifies a stronger relationship. The figure is based on a
scatter plot of the estimated coefficients in Table 2, Models (2) and (3). On the vertical and horizontal axes are the coefficients for
log SLi;[t,t+15] in Model (2) and the coefficient for log IRi;[t,t+15] in Model (3), respectively. The magnitude of the coefficients is normalized by
the standard deviation of the relevant variable [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
ences may explain why the scope and direction of policy proposals have changed as the macroprudential objective gained
traction in the regulatory debate.
The decomposition of systemic risk and our main empirical findings are illustrated in Figure 3. The figure shows a
scatter plot based on the estimated coefficients in the models for systemic linkage and bank risk; see Table 2, Models (2)
and (3), respectively. Each dot represents a single bank characteristic. The horizontal location of a bank characteristic
depends on the standardized coefficient for bank tail risk.26 A characteristic located far away from the vertical axis in
the center of the figure indicates a strong relationship to bank tail risk. Moreover, its vertical location depends on the
standardized coefficient for systemic linkage. Characteristics located far away from the horizontal axis in the center of
the figure exhibit a strong relationship to systemic linkage. The dashed diagonal refers to positions in the diagram where
the two relationships precisely cancel out with respect to the level of systemic risk. Characteristics located far away from
the diagonal have a relatively strong relationship to systemic risk: A position in the northeastern (southwestern) half of
the plane indicates a positive (negative) relationship.
Figure 3 shows which characteristics of bank business models provide an indication of banks' tail risk and systemic
risk. From a purely microprudential point of view, the effective indicators are far away from the vertical axis, as those
have stronger relationships to bank tail risk. From a macroprudential point of view, the relevant indicators are bank
characteristics that are located far away from the diagonal, as those have stronger relationships to systemic risk.
Policy implications inspired by the micro- and macroprudential objectives for regulation may differ in scope. For
example, trading revenue and other noninterest income, which includes investment banking, venture capital revenue and
net gains on loans sales, are very close to the vertical axis. Those activities are hardly related to the level of bank tail risk.
However, these indicators are located above and away from the diagonal. Consequently, trading revenue and other nonin-
terest income are associated with a higher level of banks' systemic risk. This suggests that whether banks are involved in
these activities is likely to be relevant from a macroprudential point of view, which is in line with the introduction of the
“Volcker rule” to curb risks from proprietary trading or positions in hedge funds and private equity funds at US banks.
Policy implications based on the two objectives may also differ in direction. Although large banks are generally asso-
ciated with less tail risk, bank size is located far above the diagonal, which implies that its relationship to systemic risk
26Due to standardization, a larger distance from one of the axesmeans a larger expected difference in the corresponding dependent variable with respect
to a standard deviation difference in the underlying bank characteristic.
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has an opposite sign. This may partly explain why prudential regulation was hardly concerned with bank size before the
crisis, while bank size arises as an important indicator in the context of requiring additional capital buffers at globally sys-
temically important banks (see, e.g., BCBS, 2013). Discouraging large banks may help to enhance stability of the financial
system, but may also increase risk at individual institutions by reducing diversification possibilities for each bank.
6 CONCLUSION
Our analysis shows that some characteristics of bank business models have a similar relationship to both tail risk and
systemic risk. For those characteristics, micro- and macroprudential objectives may have similar implications. However,
the analysis also reveals that some characteristics have different relationships to bank tail risk and systemic risk. This is a
result of their relationship to systemic linkage. For these characteristics, policy implications following from the two reg-
ulatory objectives may differ in scope or direction. Identifying areas in which the micro- and macroprudential objectives
have different implications is a highly relevant topic for future research.
To conclude, if it is the purpose of regulation to safeguard both the stability of banks taken in isolation and the stability
of the financial system as awhole, the focus should not only be on how bank businessmodels relate to risk at an individual
level, but also on how they relate to systemic linkage. The balance between these two relationships determines the rela-
tionship to systemic risk. This study is a first step to empirically assess these relationships based on measures estimated
from extremely adverse shocks in financial markets.
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